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This paper studies the effects on registered employment, earnings, and number of registered 
establishments of two employment subsidy schemes in Turkey. We implement a difference-
in-differences methodology to construct appropriate counterfactuals for the covered 
provinces. Our findings suggest that both subsidy programs did lead to significant net 
increases in registered jobs in eligible provinces (5%-13% for the first program and 11%-15% 
for the second). However, the cost of the actual job creation was high because of substantial 
deadweight losses, particularly for the first program (47% and 78%). Because of better 
design features, the second subsidy program had lower, though still significant, deadweight 
losses (23%-44%). Although constrained by data availability, the evidence suggests that the 
dominant effect of subsidies was to increase social security registration of firms and workers 
rather than boosting total employment and economic activity. This supports the hypothesis 
that in countries with weak enforcement institutions, high labor taxes on low-wage workers 
may lead to substantial incentives for firms and workers to operate informally. 
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Persistently high unemployment rates have led many countries in Europe and elsewhere to
implement employment subsidies with the objective of encouraging employment creation.
On average, such programs amount to about one-quarter of total expenditures on active la-
bor market policies in OECD member countries (OECD, 2003). While policymakers tend to
equate the number of beneciaries to the net employment eect of such programs, estimating
the actual impact is not so straightforward. Many beneciaries may have found jobs inde-
pendently of the subsidies. In addition, subsidies may cause some workers to lose their jobs,
either due to changes in relative wages (substitution eects) or because subsidies reduce the
market share of some rms relative to others (displacement eects). For all these reasons,
the net employment eects of the subsidies may be far from the administrative number of
beneciaries. Estimating the true impact of such initiatives requires building counterfactuals
of what would have been the employment outcome in the absence of the subsidies, a di-
cult task given the lack of random assignment programs. Despite the high interest in such
measures, there are very few studies which rigorously measure the impact of wage subsidies.
This is particularly the case for general tax cuts given the diculties involved in nding
appropriate control groups.
In this paper we examine the eects on registered employment, earnings and number of
registered workers of two regionally targeted employment subsidies oered by the Govern-
ment of Turkey to encourage investment and employment in low-income provinces. This
paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, it makes use of the progres-
sive coverage expansion of the programs to identify appropriate treatment and control groups
to estimate their eects. The research examines the incentives given by Law 5084 (2004),
which covered 37 provinces and those given by Law 5350 (2005), which expanded coverage
to 13 additional provinces, and modied qualication rules and subsidy amounts relative to
the rst scheme. Both laws subsidized employers' social security contributions, employee
personal income taxes, energy consumption and land. Since these programs aected some
provinces but not others, we estimate their eects by means of a dierence-in-dierences
methodology and explore the robustness of the results to a number of dierent specications
of models and control groups. In particular, in addition to considering as natural control
groups, the groups of provinces which are not exposed to treatment, we construct alternative
controls by selecting provinces which present similar pre-treatment trends. This regional ap-
1proach has been used to study the eects of other labor market policies and institutions in
the U.S. and elsewhere.1
Second, this paper examines the eects of program design by focusing on the dierential
eects of two subsidy programs of similar nature but with dierent eligibility conditions and
subsidy amounts.
Third, the paper examines the eects of these programs on a number of outcomes nor-
mally not considered in the literature. In addition to eect on wages, the paper distinguishes
between employment eects at the intensive and extensive margin. This distinction is im-
portant, not only to assess the eects on rm creation and number of jobs per rm, but also
because one way in which rms can circumvent eligibility conditions for marginal programs
is by shifting existing workers to newly created rms. The paper also examines whether
employment eects are due to the creation of new jobs or the conversion of unregistered
employment to registered jobs.
The Turkish economy comprises an appropriate setting to study this question because of
its high level of taxation on labor.2 In Turkey, combined employer-employee contributions
to nance pensions and disability insurance, health insurance, unemployment benets, and
workers' compensation constitute 36.5-42% of gross wages.3 Income tax ranges from 15-35%
of the gross wage.4 Comparisons of the tax wedge on labor income in Turkey with the EU-15
countries (pre-2005 members) and a selection of (new accession) EU-10 countries for workers
at dierent earnings levels and with dierent family characteristics indicates that for families
and singles with children, Turkey's taxes on labor are among the highest in the OECD.5 This
is especially the case for low-wage workers with children where Turkey has the highest tax
wedge of all of the OECD countries (World Bank, 2006). Other important features of the
Turkish economy are low job creation, low employment and participation rates and a high
1See for example Autor et al. (2006, 2007) or Besley and Burgess (2004).
2Throughout the paper, \labor taxes" is used as a term to include both social security contributions
(levied on employers and employees) as well as personal income taxes levied on employees.
3The range is due to contribution rates for work injury which vary by industry.
4Between 2000 and 2004, income tax rates ranged from 15-40%. In 2005, the top rate was cut to 35%
and the number of brackets was reduced from six to ve.
5The \tax wedge" is dened as income taxes and combined (employer-employee) social security contribu-
tions, minus cash benets, as a percentage of total labor compensation. The calculations of the tax wedge
are based on OECD estimates with additional calculations made by the World Bank to take into account
Turkey's consumption tax credits which were not included by the OECD. Note that payroll taxes account
for about 70% of Turkey's overall labor taxes.
2share of workers in the informal economy (one in three workers in urban areas and three in
four in rural areas are not registered with social security).
Our ndings suggest that both subsidy programs did lead to signicant net increases
in registered jobs in eligible provinces. Depending on the model specication, estimated
registered employment gains range from 5%-13% for the subsidy scheme under Law 5084
and from 11%-15% for Law 5350. However, the cost of the actual job creation was high,
because of substantial deadweight losses. This was particularly true for the rst program
where we estimate that between 47% and 78% of the subsidized jobs would have been created
without the program. Because of better design features, the program under Law 5350 had
lower, though still signicant, deadweight losses (23-44%) and, as a result, this appears to
have been more cost-eective even though the subsidies themselves were higher than under
Law 5084. Although data limitations constrain our capacity to test whether the dominant
eect of the subsidies was to increase social security registration of rms and workers or to
boost total employment and economic activity, the evidence we have suggests the former
was more important. This supports the hypothesis that in countries with weak enforcement
institutions, high labor taxes on low-wage workers may lead to substantial incentives for
rms and workers to operate informally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the
existing literature, while section 3 describes the regional incentives. Section 4 presents the
data, our identication strategy, and the descriptive statistics. Main results are provided in
sections 5 and 6, and a simple cost-benet analysis is conducted in section 7. Finally, section
8 concludes.
2 Previous Literature
Employment subsidies aim to reduce the cost of labor to employers.6 They can be applied
to all employment or only to new hires (marginal subsidies). They can also be general, in
the sense of applying to all workers and establishments, or specic, if only certain types of
workers (for example, low-wage, youth, long-term unemployed, women, or disabled workers)
or certain sectors or geographic locations qualify. Subsidies can be implemented as direct
6We use the terms \employment subsidies" and \wage subsidies" interchangeably to refer to subsidies
that reduce the cost of labor for employers.
3wage refunds or, quite commonly, as credits on social security contributions and other labor
taxes.
To determine the eects of employment subsidies, economists have resorted to two ap-
proaches. The rst is to make inferences based on estimates of the elasticity of labor demand.
The second is to directly estimate the employment eects of actual subsidy measures.
Regarding the rst approach, labor demand elasticity estimates give a measure of the ex-
pected percentage change in employment given a percentage change in labor costs. However,
this approach is confounded by the fact that, a priori, it is unclear whether the incidence of
the subsidy falls on the employer or on the employee, which depends on the elasticity of the
labor demand and labor supply. When the incidence is fully on the employer, subsidies will
lead to lower total labor costs and increased labor demand. However, when the incidence
is on the employee, the result will be higher take-home pay for workers and no eect on
labor demand. In the intermediate case when the two parties share the burden of a tax,
and assuming competitive labor markets, both employment and wages will increase. Other
factors can also come into play. One is whether minimum wages are binding. In that case,
excess supply of labor implies that rms can recruit more workers without having to increase
wages.
The existing literature provides some guidance on the plausible range of labor demand
elasticity estimates with most estimates clustering around the -0.30 to -0.50 range (Hamer-
mesh, 1993). Yet, as noted above, labor demand elasticities do not fully capture the employ-
ment eects of changes in subsidies (or labor taxes) because that depends also on the extent
to which they are shifted on to employees (also commonly referred as \pass through"). Stud-
ies provide a wide range of estimates, which indicate that, in some cases, the pass through
can be quite large. For example, research in Latin America suggests that anywhere from
20-70% of the employer's social security contributions are passed on to the worker (Heckman
and Pag es, 2004). However, at least one study for Chile nds full wage shift and no employ-
ment eects (Gruber, 1997). For OECD countries, Nickell (2003) concludes that the most
reasonable assessment based on the literature available is that labor taxes have a modest
eect on employment and therefore tax credits should also exert small eects. He concludes
that a 10-percentage point change in the tax wedge can be expected to aect employment by
between 1-3%, \...a relatively small but by no means insignicant eect" (p. 8). It should
be noted however that this conclusion refers to across-the-board tax credits. The evidence
4suggests that the rate of pass-through declines around the minimum wage (Taymaz, 2006).
Therefore, tax credits might have larger eects for low-wage workers.
An arguably better approach to measuring the eects of employment subsidies is to
evaluate the results of specic schemes. Most studies examine the eect of programs targeted
to the unemployed or disadvantaged workers and in many cases, estimates of eects are based
on surveys to employers. Among the few econometric studies, Katz (1998) evaluates the
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) in the U.S., a program that oered wage subsidies of 50%
of the rst year, and 25% of the second year wages up to $6,000, to employers of vulnerable
and disadvantaged workers (economically disadvantaged youth, veterans, workers on public
assistance, and disabled workers) and nds a net employment eect of 7.7%. Gern et al.
(2005) examine the eectiveness of two dierent temporary employment subsidy schemes
to get the unemployed back to work. They nd such programs to be eective for long-
term unemployed, although not for workers with short unemployment spells. On their part,
Galasso et al. (2001) evaluate a random assignment wage subsidy scheme targeted to workers
in temporary employment in Argentina (Proempleo), which subsidized 50 percent of the
rst 18 months of wages for workers employed in permanent, regular jobs and nd that
the program provided assistance to low-wage workers in nding regular wage employment,
although eects were only statistically signicant among women and youth.
On the other hand, Girma et al. (2007) examine the eects of government grants to rms
in Ireland, comparing employment in treated and untreated rms. They also nd positive
eects on employment, particularly for domestic-owned rms.
Even fewer studies examine the eect of general measures such as cuts on employers social
security taxes. Among those, Bishop (1981) employs time series methodologies to evaluate
the employment eect of the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC), a U.S. countercyclical program
that awarded a 50% tax credit to the rst $4,200 of wages per worker, provided that a rm
increased employment by more than 2% relative to the previous year. Bishop estimates an
economy-wide employment eect of the NJTC of 0.2-0.8%. A similar approach is used to
estimate the eects of SPAK, a scheme introduced in 1996 in the Netherlands to permanently
reduce taxes and social security contributions paid by employers for workers with wages
around the minimum wage. All workers could benet from this subsidy including those
already at work. M uhlau and Salverda (2000) found that the introduction of this measure
did not raise employment growth, not even in sectors, such as retail, that are intensive in
5the use of low-wage labor.
An important issue with this literature is that nding convincing conterfactuals of what
would be the employment outcome in the absence of the program has proven to be dicult.
Treated and not treated workers or rms may not be comparable. Matching on observables, a
usual method to construct counterfactuals of treated individuals or rms, does not necessarily
solve the selection issue. Finding convincing instruments is also dicult, as variables that
predict participation tend to be correlated with program outcomes. Finding a counterfactual
is particularly dicult when evaluating general tax cuts given the lack of suitable control
groups.
Given the amount of resources devoted to these programs, and their popularity across
developed and developing countries, nding appropriate ways to build counterfactuals and
gathering better knowledge on their eects on a number of outcomes could greatly improve
policy design. Another key issue for policy design and about which little is known is the
deadweight loss of subsidies. Most estimates are obtained from interviews with employers
rather than from quantitative estimates. Even though employers may not have the right
incentives to report the actual numbers they would have employed in the absence of sub-
sidies, such estimates still suggest large deadweight losses. These are associated with the
impossibility of targeting subsidies to workers who would not have been hired without the
subsidy. Estimates of deadweight loss range from around 53-70% for marginal subsidization
under targeted programs and up to 93% for non-targeted, non-marginal general measures
(Marx, 2005).
In the next sections we attempt to ll some of these gaps by estimating the employment,
wage, and rm-creation eects, as well as the deadweight losses, of two marginal subsidization
schemes targeted to low-wage workers in low-income provinces in Turkey. We believe the
sequential, geographically targeted roll out of the programs provides ideal characteristics to
estimate their impact.
3 Regional Subsidies in Turkey
We analyze the eects of a series of regional incentive schemes legislated through Law 4325
(1998), Law 5084 (2004), and Law 5350 (2005), aimed at increasing investments and employ-
ment opportunities in low-income provinces. Initially, 22 provinces were covered under Law
64325. Law 5084 expanded coverage to an additional 15 provinces, while Law 5350 further
increased coverage to 13 additional provinces. Given that our data do not cover the period
before Law 4325 was enacted, we focus our attention on the subsidies oered under Laws 5084
and 5350. While such laws diered in terms of actual requirements and subsidy amounts,
they included four subsidy components: (i) reductions in employers' social security contri-
butions; (ii) credits on income taxes on wages; (iii) subsidies on electricity consumption; and
(iv) land subsidies. Firms in an eligible province could receive subsidies provided they had
monthly social security premium documents, electricity consumption records, and documen-
tation showing income and corporation tax liabilities. No additional written application was
required, which implied low transaction costs.
Law 5084 became eective in January 2004 and the duration of the scheme was set to
be ve years. It covered all provinces with per capita GDP of $1,500 or less (in 2001) and
provinces designated as priority development regions. All provinces (but one) covered under
Law 4325 qualied for this program,7 and any rm that received subsidies under Law 4325
could choose to continue to receive subsidies under the rst law even after the enactment of
the second. In addition, 15 additional provinces not covered under Law 4325 qualied for
benets under Law 5084.8
Under Law 5084, rms could obtain: (i) a subsidy on the social security contributions due
at the minimum contribution base9 and (ii) an income tax subsidy for the amount due at the
minimum wage. Only new registered employment was subsidized. For establishments created
on and after October 2003, subsidies were calculated based on all registered employees while
for establishments that started operations before that date, subsidies were calculated based
on the number of workers over and above those registered with social security on the reference
date (August 2003). Establishments located within industrial zones were fully subsidized
for their calculated social security contributions and income taxes, whereas establishments
outside industrial zones received compensation for only 80% of such amounts.
7Tunceli was covered under Law 4325 and Law 5350, but was not covered under Law 5084.
8See the Appendix for a full list of provinces covered under the three laws.
9Before July 2004 the minimum contribution base was above the minimum wage. During this period,
employers who hired workers at a wage below the contribution base were required to pay, in addition to the
regular employer contribution, the employee contribution for the dierence between the minimum base and
the minimum wage. As of July 2004, the minimum wage was raised to match the minimum contribution
base. Changes in the minimum contribution base relative to the minimum wage lead to substantial changes
in the cost of hiring low-wage workers, which in turn aected the demand for labor (Papps, 2007).
7In addition, newly created rms employing at least 10 registered workers could also
claim an energy subsidy equal to 20% of their energy costs, plus 0.5% of that amount for
each additional new worker. Existing rms, on the other hand, could get the subsidy if their
registered employment increased by at least 20% since the reference date and their current
employment was at least 10 workers. The subsidy was capped at 40% or 50% (in industrial
zones) of total energy costs. Finally, free land was also available in some cases for rms that
would employ no less than 10 workers for at least 5 years.
Law 5350 came into eect in May 2005 and modied a number of provisions in Law
5084. It extended coverage to 13 additional provinces with low socio-economic development
according to an index elaborated by the Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO). Again,
any rm that received subsidies under the previous law (5084) could choose to continue to
receive subsidies under that law even after the enactment of Law 5350. To qualify under the
new law, newly-created rms were now required to have at least 30 registered employees,
while existing rms had to increase employment by at least 20% from the new reference date
(January 2005), and have at least 30 employees. For existing establishments, the number of
workers for which rms could claim either tax or social security subsidies could not exceed
the total number of initially employed workers (at the new reference date). Law 5350 also
imposed a minimum threshold size of 30 employees for new and incumbent rms to claim
energy subsidies. In addition, the latter had to demonstrate an employment increase of at
least 20% in order to le for benets. However, Law 5350 increased the amount of the subsidy
for each eligible worker from one time the tax and social security payable at the minimum
wage (or base) to 3 times that amount.10 This implied that, for every eligible worker, the law
subsidized the taxes and social security contributions of two already-employed workers. As
in Law 5084, establishments located within industrial zones were fully subsidized for their
calculated social security contributions and income taxes, whereas establishments outside
industrial zones received compensation for 80% of such amounts.
[Table 1 about here.]
Given the complexities of the legal framework it may be useful to provide a couple of
examples (a general comparison of the laws is also provided in table 1). Consider, for
10Two additional constraints are that (i) the total value of the tax subsidy cannot exceed the amount
calculated multiplying the income tax payable at the minimum wage on the number of workers and (ii) the
social security subsidy cannot exceed the value that results from multiplying the social security contribution
payable at the minimum base by the number of workers.
8example, a rm with 10 registered employees that increases registered employment by 20%
from the reference date. Under Law 5084, this rm would obtain a subsidy for 2 workers
during all periods in which employment was above employment at the reference date. Under
Law 5350, this rm could not obtain any subsidy since 12 employees is below the minimum
threshold of 30. Law 5350 favors larger rms, relative to Law 5084.
Let us now assume the case of a rm that starts with 10 registered employees and increases
its employment to 30. In this case, under Law 5084 the rm would obtain a subsidy for 20
employees. Under Law 5350, the calculation is more complicated. Although the incremental
employment is 20, the number of subsidized workers cannot exceed initial employment (i.e.,
10). Since the total subsidy under Law 5350 is three times the incremental employment, but
only 10 new workers can be counted, the total subsidy is for 30 workers. Therefore, while
fewer workers would be eligible, the total amount paid in subsidies increases in Law 5350
relative to Law 5084 under this example.
One problem with marginal subsidization is that it creates incentives for rms to manip-
ulate employment. Thus, when subsidies are given only to new hires, rms have incentives
to outsource labor to other rms which, in turn, can claim that employment as marginal.11
Laws 5084 and 5350 explicitly prohibit such tactics, however enforcement is always prob-
lematic. Law 5350 may reduce these incentives since imposing a minimum of 30 employees
reduces the incentives to outsource existing labor in small independent units in charge of
activities such as cleaning, cafeterias, cashiers, etc., although such incentives may still exist
for large rms. Figure 1 shows that if labor demand is above Lmin = 30 and Lmax > L2 ,
where Lmax is equal to twice the initial employment (2L0), employment increases by much
more (from L0 to L2) under Law 5350 than under 5084 (from L0 to L1).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Given the discussion in this section and the section above, it is predicted that if: (i)
the subsidy schemes had a sucient take-up rate; (ii) the demand for labor in Turkey is
suciently elastic (i.e., it is downward sloping); and (iii) subsidies were not fully transferred
to workers in the form of higher wages, then employment and gross wages would increase
in a magnitude given by the elasticity of the labor demand and supply. In addition, it
11Marginal incentives can also motivate rms to lower the reference employment in order to be able to
claim higher marginal subsidies. Under the two laws discussed, such incentives were limited by setting the
reference employment suciently far prior to the enactment of the laws.
9is also expected that Law 5350 would yield larger employment eects concentrated in the
intensive, rather than the extensive, margin (i.e., primarily through expansion of existing
rms rather than creation of new ones). In the next sections we describe our data and
empirical methodology and assess whether our results conrm these priors.
4 Data and Specication
4.1 Data
The data used in this study come from three sources. The main source, provided by the
Social Security Administration of Turkey (henceforth SSK), is a monthly panel of province-
level data.12 It includes information on the number of registered workplaces, registered
employees, total taxable earnings that are subject to contributions, and SSK premiums. We
compute real average taxable earnings, dividing the total taxable earnings by the number of
registered employees and correcting for in
ation13. While the data are available for the period
January 1998 to December 2005, we restrict our analysis to 3,555 monthly observations on
79 provinces covering the period April 2002 to December 2005. This choice was motivated
by a number of data problems and inconsistencies in the earlier part of the sample.14
Data on the cost of energy subsidies, available for the period January 2004 to December
2005, was provided by the Turkish Treasury and it gives information on the number of
subsidized workplaces, subsidized employment, and the cost of the energy incentives per
month and province.
Finally, since data on provincial GDP is not available for the period of study, we use
information on electricity consumption per province and year for period 2003-2005 in order
to approximate the real level of economic activity in a province at a given point in time.
This is done to assess whether employment increases in subsidized provinces are likely to be
new jobs or the conversion of unregistered employment to registered jobs. This annual data
set, available for 1995 to 2004, is provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute and includes
12The SSK data are actually provided on a sub-provincial basis (i.e., SSK reporting unit). The sub-
provincial data were aggregated up to a provincial basis for each month.
13In the rest of the paper we use \real average taxable earnings" and \real wages" interchangeably. It
should be kept in mind that whenever we say real wages, we actually refer to real average taxable earnings.
14Two provinces (Kocaeli and Mus) were excluded because of unreliable data due to inconsistent admin-
istrative reporting.
10information on the total electricity consumption of each province.
Table 2 provides the summary statistics for the main variables used in this study. In this
table, the unit is an individual province in an individual month.
[Table 2 about here.]
4.2 Methodology
We use a \dierence-in-dierences" approach to estimate the eects of the subsidies under
Laws 5084 and 5350. To do so, we compare the change in performance between the period
pre- and post-introduction of subsidies in the provinces that benet from them (\treated
provinces") with the change in performance in the provinces that are not covered (\con-
trol provinces"). Since the data span dierent subsidy regimes, covering dierent sets of
provinces, we choose dierent \control" and \treatment" groups, depending on the regime
being analyzed.
To clarify our characterization of control and treatment groups, we dene the following
groups of provinces: D 4325, which contains the 22 provinces that were subsidized under
Law 4325; D 5084, which includes the 15 provinces that were subsidized under Law 5084
but not covered by Law 4325; and, nally, D 5350, which contains the 13 provinces that
were subsidized by Law 5350 but not covered by Law 5084. In that way, each group only
includes the eligible provinces added under each consecutive law. We also dene the group
D never, which contains the provinces that were not subsidized under any law. The list
of provinces covered under each law is graphically depicted in Figure 2 and detailed in the
table in the Appendix. Similarly, it is also useful to dene three separate time periods:
Period 0, which covers the period before January 2004; Period 1 which covers the period
between January 2004 to April 2005, when Law 5084 was in eect, and when both D 4325
and D 5084 provinces received subsidies under Law 5084; and Period 2, which covers the
period between May 2005 to December 2005 in which provinces D 4325, D 5084 and D 5350
were eligible to receive subsidies under Law 5350.
[Figure 2 about here.]
There are two \natural" control groups that can be used to estimate the eect of Law
5084 on D 5084 provinces. The rst one is given by D 5350. These are provinces that
11are very similar in terms of income, geographical location, and density of population to the
provinces in the D 5084 group but fell above the minimum income per capita threshold
to qualify for subsidies under Law 5084 (see Table 3 and Figure 2). The second natural
control group is the D never provinces, which did not receive subsidies under any subsidy
scheme. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, D 5350 provinces
are similar in terms of income and other characteristics to provinces D 5084 and therefore
may oer a better counterfactual of the evolution in a number of economic variables had the
subsidies not taken place. On the other hand, it may be argued that economic incentives
may create stronger substitution eects between similar and geographically close provinces
than between provinces that dier substantially in income and other attributes. From that
point of view, the D never group may give a better idea of the eects of the subsidies net
of substitution eects.
[Table 3 about here.]
Similarly, D never provinces constitute a natural control group when estimating the
eect of Law 5350 on D 5350 provinces. The fact that we can only observe the rst 8
months of subsidies under Law 5350 means that our results for that scheme are based on
less evidence than is the case for Law 5084.
Using provinces that do not receive the treatment as a control group for those that receive
the treatment is intuitive and quite common in practice. However, a major pitfall of such
a strategy is that the identifying assumption of dierence-in-dierences models (that the
comparison group provides the counterfactual of what would have happened in the treated
group) is not guaranteed to hold since control and treated provinces can have dierent
pre-treatment evolutions in outcomes. In order to overcome this problem, we construct
\alternative" control groups for D 5084 and D 5350 provinces. These alternative control
groups consist of untreated provinces that had the same pre-treatment trend in outcomes as
treated provinces.15 To nd these provinces we estimate the following specications:
Yjt = 0 + Month0 + Y ear1 + D 5084  Month2 + D 5084  Y ear3 + jt (1)
Yjt = 1 + Month0 + Y ear1 + D 5350  Month2 + D 5350  Y ear3 + jt (2)
15For details on this strategy, see Evans and Lien (2005).
12where Yjt is employment or number of establishments (in log levels or in growth rates),
Month is a vector of month dummies, Y ear is a vector of year dummies and jt and jt are
error terms. Each of these specications analyze the dierential evolution of the outcomes
during the pre-treatment period in the treated provinces relative to the control group. In
particular, specication 1 is used to choose an alternative control group for D 5084 provinces
and is estimated with data from D 5084 provinces and a candidate control province for the
pre-treatment period 0. The pool of candidate control provinces is given by the 31 D never
provinces and the 13 D 5350 provinces. We choose as alternative control provinces those for
which an F-test that the interaction terms are jointly zero cannot be rejected for at least 3
of the 4 outcomes (employment and establishments, growth and levels) Of the 44 candidate
provinces, 10 passed this test (6 D never and 4 D 5350 provinces).16 We label these as the
\Alt 5084" control group.
Similarly, specication 2 is estimated with data from D 5350 provinces and a potential
control province for period 1. In this case, the alternative control group is chosen from
the 31 D never provinces. An analogous F-test yields an alternative control group with 11
provinces.17 We name these as the \Alt 5350" control group.
Given the description of our dierent treated and control groups, we next move on to
estimating the eects of the laws on subsidized provinces. In order to do so, we use the
following two specications:
Yjt = 0 + 0Period 1 + 1D 5084 + 2D 5084  Period 1 + jt (3)
Yjt = 1 + 
0Period 2 + 
1D 5350 + 
2D 5350  Period 2 + jt (4)
where Yjt is an outcome variable (employment, real wages, number of establishments)
either in log levels or in growth rates and jt and jt are error terms. Specication 3 studies
the eect of Law 5084 on D 5084 provinces. In order to estimate this eect, we only include
observations pertaining to periods 0 and 1, and D 5084 provinces and one of their control
groups (D never, D 5350 and Alt 5084 provinces). The coecient on D 5084  Period 1
measures whether there is a dierential change in performance between period 0 and period
16These provinces include Bilecik, Bolu, Burdur, Elazig, Isparta, Kastamonu, Nigde, Rize, Kirikkale and
Yalova.
17Alternative control provinces for D 5350 provinces include Bilecik, Bolu, Burdur, Canakkale, Edirne,
Isparta, Kirklareli, Zonguldak, Kirikkale, Yalova and Karabuk.
131 in the treatment group relative to the corresponding control group.
Similarly, specication 4 addresses the eect of Law 5350 on D 5350 provinces. In this
case, we estimate the model using only periods 1 and 2, and D 5350 provinces and one of
their control groups (D never and Alt 5350 provinces). The coecient on D 5350Period 2
measures the dierential change in performance between period 1 and period 2 in D 5350
provinces compared to the relevant control provinces.
We enrich these basic specications in dierent ways. In most specications, we control
for province-specic eects to account, among other things, for dierences in population
as well as dierences in the level and sector distribution of economic activity by adding
a set of province dummies to our basic specication. Obviously, since these variables are
collinear with the province group indicators, the latter are dropped from the specication.
In some specications we allow the time eects to dier month by month, by including a
full set of dummies for each time observation in our sample. In addition, we also account
for dierences in the evolution of variables at the province level by including a full set of
province specic-trends in some of the specications.
Finally, following Bertrand et al. (2004), we allow for the error term to be auto-correlated
within provinces by estimating Huber-White robust standard errors clustered at the province
level in all specications.
4.3 Summary statistics
Tables 4 to 6 provide summary statistics for monthly growth rates of registered employ-
ment, registered workplaces, and real wages. The row all provinces reports results for the
79 provinces included in this study. We also present descriptive statistics separately for
provinces D 5084, D 5350, D never, Alt 5084 and Alt 5350, and for sub-periods determined
according to the enactment date of each law.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
These tables provide some preliminary, descriptive evidence on the eects of these sub-
sidy schemes on the growth rates of the outcome variables. D 5084 and D 5350 provinces
14experience marked increases in their average monthly growth rates of employment and work-
places during the periods when they are rst covered by a subsidy scheme. In particular,
the mean monthly employment growth of D 5084 provinces increases ve-fold from 0.4% in
Period 0 to 2% in Period 1. Similarly, average monthly growth in the number of registered
establishments in D 5084 provinces increases almost two-fold from 0.7% in Period 0 to 1.3%
in Period 1. Employment and establishment growth in D 5350 provinces between periods 1
and 2 also experience substantial increases, reaching 2.6% (from 1.0%) and 1.5% (from 0.5%),
respectively. On the other hand, employment and establishment growth in the D never and
Alt 5350 provinces increases at a much slower pace than in the treated provinces. Although,
Alt 5084 provinces seem to experience employment growth increases in Period 1 similar to
those in D 5084 provinces, they do not have increases in their establishment growth rates.
Table 6 presents summary statistics for real wage (dened as real average taxable earn-
ings) growth across province groups and sub-periods. Unlike the employment and establish-
ment trends, signicant impacts of the subsidy programs are not apparent. There is little
evidence that the eects of reduced taxes on employees are passed on to workers in the form
of higher wages. In fact, wage growth in the treated provinces declines after the introduction
of subsidies. For example, the monthly wage growth in D 5084 provinces declines from 0.8%
in Period 0 to no growth in Period 1. A similar pattern characterizes D 5350 provinces in
Period 2, with a slight decline in average monthly wage growth from 0.3% to -0.1%. In com-
parison, wage growth is higher in the never treated provinces in both periods 1 and 2 than
in the treated provinces. Even though, the growth rate of real wages in Alt 5084 provinces
decline between Period 0 and Period 1, they still experience positive growth as opposed to
none in D 5084 provinces. Alt 5350 provinces, on the other hand, have the same pattern of
change as D 5350 provinces.
[Table 6 about here.]
Before moving on to the results of our econometric analysis, it may be useful to visualize
some of the results by presenting the month-to-month evolution of outcomes in treatment
versus control provinces. Figure 3 illustrates graphically the impacts of Law 5084 and 5350
on treated provinces (D 5084 and D 5350) compared to the alternative control provinces
(Alt 5084 and Alt 5350).18 These gures also provide visual evidence on the comparability
18We present gures with alternative control provinces since these groups are statistically found to be
similar to the treated ones. Similar gures using the remaining control groups conrm our analysis in this
15of trends in outcomes between treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period.
Figures 3(a) and 3(c) illustrate the eects of Law 5084. These gures present the average
employment and number of establishments separately for D 5084 and Alt 5084 provinces.
It is quite clear that both employment and establishments in D 5084 provinces increase at a
much faster rate compared to Alt 5084 provinces shortly after January 2004 when Law 5084
came into eect.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figures 3(b) and 3(d) present comparable trends for D 5350 and Alt 5350 provinces.
Although the period covered is short, these graphs still show some evidence of the law
having an eect, especially on employment. Figure 3(b) shows that, while during Period 0
and Period 1 employment in D 5350 provinces followed a similar path with the Alt 5350
provinces, after May 2005 when Law 5350 was enacted, employment in D 5350 provinces
started growing at a higher rate than in the control provinces. The eect of Law 5350 on
workplaces seems to be much smaller, lending support to our expectation that Law 5350
would yield larger eects at the intensive rather than extensive margin.
5 Econometric Results
We move next to describing the results of estimating specications 3 and 4 which are summa-
rized in Tables 7, 8, and 9 for employment, number of establishments, and wages, respectively.
5.1 Employment
The left panel of Table 7 presents the estimates for the eect of Law 5084 on employment
for three dierent control groups, and four alternative specications. Focusing rst on the
rst top panel, which uses provinces D never as control, and rst column, which presents
the results of a specication with period and group dummies as described in specication
3, the coecient on the interaction between the variables D 5084 and Period 1 is positive
and statistically signicant, indicating that after the introduction of subsidies, employment
in provinces D 5084 increased by 5% more in the treated than in the control provinces.
section.
16[Table 7 about here.]
Results do not change if the specication is augmented with a full set of province and date
dummies (column 2). Similarly, allowing for province-specic time trends yields positive and
statistically signicant eects of the subsidies (column 3). The magnitude of the coecient,
however, becomes larger, suggesting that Law 5084 subsidies boosted employment in the
D 5084 provinces by almost 8% above the level in the control (D never) provinces.
Similarly, the story remains when employment growth, rather than employment levels,
is specied as the dependent variable (column 4). The coecient on the D 5084  Period 1
interaction suggests that in Period 1, Law 5084 increased employment growth in the treated
provinces by 1 percentage point a month relative to the control.
The middle left panel of Table 7 shows the estimates using D 5350 provinces as the control
group for the eect of Law 5084. Results again suggest subsidies provided a signicant boost
to employment levels and growth in D 5084 provinces. The coecient on the interaction
term D 5084* Period 1 in columns (1)-(3) is positive and statistically signicant in all but
in the specication with province-specic time trends. Nonetheless, the coecients on the
growth regressions (column 4) appear positive and statistically signicant which suggests
that the lack of signicance in column 3 may be due to insucient degrees of freedom.19
The implied magnitudes are sizable: in Period 1, employment in the treated provinces would
have increased by 12.7% above the D 5350 control group in two of the three specications.
In terms of growth rates, the estimated eect of the subsidies amounts to 1.8 percentage
points per month.
The bottom left panel of Table 7 presents results with the alternative control group,
constructed to match pre-treatment trends in the treated provinces. Results indicate positive
and statistically signicant eects across all specications, of a magnitude that lies between
those obtained with D never or D 5350 provinces as control.
The right panel of Table 7 presents the estimated eects of Law 5350 on the employment
of D 5350 provinces, using the never subsidized provinces (top panel) or Alt 5350 (bottom
panel) as control groups. Estimated eects are positive, statistically signicant and very
similar in either case, regardless of whether the specication includes period and group
dummies only (column 5), or is augmented with a full set of month dummies (column 6) or
19Province-specic trends become province-xed eect after taking rst dierences of specication in
column (2).
17province-specic time trends (column 7).
As expected, we estimate larger eects of Law 5350 relative to Law 5084. For, example,
the coecients obtained using the alternative controls and a specication with a full set of
province and time dummies, yield an eect of Law 5350 on employment of 11% relative to
an eect of Law 5084 of 8.6%. The comparable magnitudes obtained when using the never
treated provinces as control are 14.2% versus 8.1%. Obviously these larger eects need to
be assessed against costs estimates of both programs. We retake this issue in section 7.
Taken together, these results suggest a positive, sizable, and statistically signicant eect
of the regional subsidies on employment levels and growth in the covered provinces, with the
magnitude of the eect greater for Law 5350. Regarding Law 5084, the estimated magnitude
of the eect is larger when D 5350 provinces are considered as control group. While 5350
provinces are more similar to the D 5084 group than never provinces, the larger eects may
be capturing substitution eects. It is plausible that the subsidies motivate some rms to
change locations, or shift jobs across similar and geographically close provinces in order to
gain access to the subsidies.
5.2 Number of establishments
We next turn to examining how subsidies aected the number of establishments. Results
are presented in Table 8, which is organized in the same fashion as Table 7. The left panel
provides the estimates of the eects of Law 5084 and the right panel the results for Law
5350. Each row panel provides estimates for a dierent control group.
Assessing rst the eects of Law 5084, results indicate that relative to the never subsidized
provinces, the number and growth rate of establishments increased in provinces D 5084 as
a result of Law 5084 (as indicated by a positive and statistically signicant coecient on
D 5084  Period 1 in columns (1)-(4)). The estimates suggest that the subsidies increased
the number of establishments by between 2.5% and 4.1% above the control group, while the
establishment growth rate increased by about 0.5 percentage points.
[Table 8 about here.]
Similar results are obtained if D 5350 or Alt 5084 provinces are used as control groups,
with the exception that the coecients on column (3) are not statistically signicant. Nonethe-
less, estimates are positive and statistically signicant when the dependent variable is the
18growth of workplaces, suggesting again that the lack of statistical signicance in column(3)
may be due to insucient degrees of freedom.
Regarding Law 5350, we nd mixed evidence of its eects on the number of establish-
ments. Controlling only for time and province indicators does not yield a statistically signi-
cant eect (columns 1 and 2), regardless of the control group used. Adding province-specic
time dummies yields a positive and statistically signicant coecient on the interaction
term, which also appears in the growth regressions, suggesting that Law 5350 would have
increased the growth in the number of workplaces by 0.3 percentage points. Lastly, results
are even more mixed when using the Alternative control group, with statistically signicant
results only for the specication with province-specic time trends. Thus, assessments on
whether Law 5350 increased the number of establishments in 5350 provinces depend to great
extent on which specication and control group is chosen. Considering that the constructed
control group matches pre-treatment trends, it can be argued that specication (2) is an
appropriated model, in which case, it could be tentatively concluded that law 5350 had a
lower impact on the number of establishments than Law 5084 and that most of the results
of Law 5350 on employment were on the intensive rather than the extensive margin.
As with employment, we also nd the eects of Law 5084 to be more sizable if D 5350
provinces are used as a control group, which again could indicate some substitution eects
across provinces. All in all, our results suggest that Law 5084, and more tentatively Law
5350, had a positive eect in the number and growth of workplaces in the treated provinces.
Such eects could be driven by either higher expected prots or rms' incentives to outsource
workers to eligible rms in order to claim marginal benets. The evidence also suggests that
such incentives would have been reduced in the second law, as the size and signicance of the
estimated eects on the number of establishments tends to be lower, despite sizable eects
on employment. As predicted by Figure 1, Law 5350 would have led to higher employment
growth per rm. Combining the results in Tables 7 and 8 (columns 2 and 6) using the
alternative controls, we nd that Law 5084 and Law 5350 increased the number of workers
per establishment by 3.7% and 10%, respectively. In other words, growth at the intensive
margin was the most important part of the overall eect of these regional incentive program,
particularly in the case of Law 5350.
195.3 Earnings
Finally, we examine the eects of the subsidies on earnings (Table 9). As discussed in section
2, there is substantial agreement in the literature that taxes on wages are, to a large extent,
shifted on to workers in the form of lower wages. The same logic would indicate that,
assuming symmetry, employment subsidies are expected to be at least partially shifted back
to workers as wage increases. As discussed in section 4, we do not have data on individual
wages or earnings. Instead, we approximate earnings per worker by dividing total taxable
earnings by the number of workers in each province.20
[Table 9 about here.]
Subjecting the wage data to the same menu of specications and control groups ana-
lyzed for employment and number of establishments provides little evidence of wage shifts.
Regardless of the specication or the control group, we never nd positive and statistically
signicant coecients on the interaction terms. In fact, focusing rst on Law 5084, the
growth specication (column 4) yields coecients that are negative and statistically signif-
icant. The evidence then suggests that subsidies either had no eect on wages or, if there
was an eect, it was negative.
Regarding Law 5350, the evidence points even more strongly to negative and statistically
signicant eects on taxable earnings. The only exception is given by the coecients in
column 8, which are positive but not statistically dierent from zero.
These results run counter to those found by Taymaz (2006) for Turkey, where based on an
analysis of manufacturing data, he nds strong evidence of a wage pass-through. His ndings,
however, also indicate that the pass-through is substantially reduced for wages around the
minimum wage. One possible explanation for our results, then, is that minimum wages are
binding in subsidized regions and therefore, the pass-through for low-wage workers is low.
Table 10 shows that average taxable earnings are lower and closer to the minimum wage in
D 5084 and D 5350 provinces than in the never-treated provinces, but our data do not allow
us to infer whether minimum wages are eectively binding. Another possible explanation is
that subsidies{which are set at minimum wage/contribution base levels{stimulate rms to
20Due to a maximum and a minimum in the taxable earnings base, taxable earnings and earnings dier
in the low and upper part of the distribution. This implies, for example, that if wage shifts occur only at
the upper end of the distribution we would not capture it.
20hire workers with relatively lower earnings and that, as a result, on average, taxable earnings
decline. The larger negative eect of law 5350, coinciding with larger employment eects,
lends support to this hypothesis. Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to test directly
these eects.
[Table 10 about here.]
5.4 Anticipation of Laws
One potential problem in our analysis is that the assumptions underlying dierence-in-
dierences estimates are invalid if employers expect the enactment of subsidy laws and
strategically delay hiring new workers or creating new establishments until after the law is
introduced. In this case, our estimates would be upward biased. In order to address this
issue, we use an interrupted panel strategy. The intuition is that, by dropping a few months
of data before and after the enactment of each law, we can mitigate the eect of such strate-
gic responses by eliminating periods when employers have the highest incentive to shift the
creation of jobs and rms. However, we do not conduct such analysis for Law 5350 due to
the short span of the post-treatment period for that law (Period 2) covered by our data.
In order to check the robustness of our estimates for Law 5084, we re-run specication 3
after dropping the three months before and after the enactment of the law. Hence, in this
case, Period 0 covers the period between April 2002 to September 2003 and Period 1 covers
the period between April 2004 to April 2005.21 Table 11 provides the results of these inter-
rupted panel estimations. The results change little when applying the interrupted panels,
with virtually no qualitative dierence from our original estimates. Quantitatively, inter-
rupted panel regressions yield somewhat larger estimates in absolute terms, which suggests
that an upward bias resulting from strategic responses of employers is unlikely and that our
dierence-in-dierences estimates do capture the real eects of the subsidy law.
[Table 11 about here.]
21Recall that Law 5084 subsidizes all registered employment in establishments created on and after October
2003, while for establishments that started operations before that date, subsidies are calculated based on
the number of workers over and above those registered with social security on the reference date (August
2003). If employers strategically lowered employment on the reference date or postponed job creation around
October 2003 to get subsidies for all of their workers, dropping the three months before the start of Law 5084
might not be enough to remove strategic behavior of employers. For that reason, we also tried an alternative
specication where we dropped the 6 months before and 3 months after Law 5084 with very similar results.
21The rst column of table 11 shows that, on average, during period 1 employment increased
by 4.4 to 13.2% more in D 5084 provinces than in the control provinces. Similarly, our results
suggest that in Period 1, Law 5084 increased employment growth in the treated provinces
by 1.1{2.6 percentage points a month.
Columns 3 and 4 provide results for the number of establishments. As in the case of
employment, we nd the eect of Law 5084 to be larger under these specications: the
number of establishments increased by between 0.4% and 5.3% above the control provinces,
while the establishment growth rate increased by about 1 percentage point.
Finally, the last two columns of the table conrm our previous conclusions on real av-
erage taxable earnings that the subsidies had either no eect on wages or a negative eect.
The magnitude of the eect of the law are larger in these later regressions suggesting, at
their lowest estimate, a reduction of 1.7% in the treated provinces compared to the control
provinces.
Larger eects in the interrupted panel for employment and establishments suggest the
eects of the program pick up after a few months of operation. This is also consistent with
more negative eects on taxable earning in the interrupted panel.
6 Formalization versus Job Creation
Taken together, the estimates presented in the previous section suggest that the dierent
subsidy packages had important eects in stimulating the growth of registered employment
and registered establishments in low-income regions of Turkey. Unfortunately, these data do
not allow us to determine whether these increases actually represented new jobs or estab-
lishments or, instead, resulted from the formalization of previously non-registered (informal)
employment and rms. To investigate this issue, ideally we would require household data
on total employment - formal and informal - by province and period. Unfortunately, we do
not have access to province identiers in household data and, therefore, it is not possible to
look at the evolution of formalization versus total employment generation in this way.
Another possible approach is to examine whether economic activity has increased in the
treated relative to the control provinces. Unfortunately, province-level GDP data for the
period of analysis were not yet available. As an alternative approach, we analyze electricity
consumption data. Since electricity cannot be stored, its consumption is closely correlated
22with the level of economic activity and is a commonly used proxy for economic activity. If
registered employment and establishment gains re
ect an actual increase in total employment
and number of establishments, then economic activity would have increased and, therefore,
the consumption of energy should have increased as well. Since monthly electricity data per
province are not available, we estimate the model with annual data for the period 2002-2004.
We examine this hypothesis by estimating the following specication22:
Zjt = '0 + '1D post + '2D 4325 + '3D 5084 + '4D 5350
+ '5D 4325  D post + '6D 5084  D post + '7D 5350  D post + jt
(5)
where Zjt is consumption of electricity, D post is the post-treatment period (i.e., year
2004), and the rest of the variables are as described before. The coecient on the D 5084 
D post variable measures the dierential change in electricity consumption during the post-
treatment period in provinces D 5084 relative to D never provinces. A positive and signif-
icant coecient on this variable would be consistent with the hypothesis that employment
created because of the subsidies was due to an increase in economic activity.
As shown in Table 12, the estimates suggest that electricity consumption did not increase
after the enactment of Law 5084. It should be recognized that data availability is a limiting
factor since we are only able to use three observations per province, with only one after Law
5084 was introduced. Moreover, subsidies were paid only for the last 10 months of that year.
While these results are limited by the factors noted above, they suggest that the gains in
employment and number of rms correspond to a surge in formalization, rather than to real
gains in economic activity.
[Table 12 about here.]
7 Cost of the programs
We next analyze the expenditure side of the regional incentives programs in order to estimate
the cost of formal job creation. The calculation of the costs incurred under the programs
22We also estimated specications based on 3 with annual data and the the alternative control groups with
very similar results.
23includes the social security, income tax, and energy subsidies. The social security costs are
provided in the SSK database. The income tax costs, while not directly available, can be
estimated as a proportion of the social security subsidies.23 The costs of the energy subsidies
are obtained from Treasury data. Land has not been included in the cost calculations because
neither data nor a method for approximating these costs is available. Hence, our estimates
of total costs are downwardly biased.
Expenditures under Law 5084 and estimates of the cost per job are presented in Table
13. These cover the 14-month period from March 2004, when the rst subsidies were paid,
to April 2005, the last month before Law 5350 came into eect. Four calculations have been
made to estimate the cost per job. The rst divides the total cost of the subsidies by the
number of subsidized \job-months" as reported in the SSK administrative les during the
period.24 In eect, this computation assumes that each subsidized job-month was actually
created due to the subsidy. A comparison of the total number of jobs subsidized with the
total number of jobs created as estimated through our models provides an estimate of the
\deadweight loss" - i.e., the number of jobs that were unnecessarily subsidized. The other
three calculations compute the cost per \net" job-month created, using our econometric
modeling results to determine how many jobs were actually created because of the program.
These three calculations are based on a low, a medium, and a high estimate of the eects.
[Table 13 about here.]
According to the SSK les, 739,757 \job-months" were subsidized under Law 5084 in all
the D 5084 provinces. The table also shows that our estimate of the total subsidy cost - based
on the social security and energy subsidy data and our derived estimate of the income tax
subsidy - was 112,275,769YTL (New Turkish lira). This implies that the cost per job-month
was 152YTL. During the months when Law 5084 subsidies were being paid, the average
23In order to calculate the income tax subsidy, we assumed that everyone who got the social security
subsidy also got the income tax subsidy. The income tax rate on the minimum wage was 15%. So, income
subsidy=(#eligible workers)*(100 or 80%)*(minimum wage)*15%. It is also described in the laws that the
amount of SSK subsidy was calculated as: SSK subsidy=(#eligible workers)*(100 or 80%)*(contribution
base)*20.5%. Hence, one can calculate the amount of total income tax subsidy received as a fraction of the
SSK subsidy received. For the period April 2002 to June 2004, income subsidy=0.56*social security subsidy
as the contribution base diers from the minimum wage. For the period July 2004 to December 2005: income
subsidy=0.73*social security subsidy as the contribution base equals the minimum wage.
24A \job-month" refers to a worker who has been subsidized during a particular month. We refer to
job-months rather than jobs because the SSK data are provided on a monthly basis.
24monthly labor cost for a minimum wage worker was 548YTL. So the cost per job-month,
based on the number of subsidized jobs, was about 28% of the total labor cost for a minimum
wage worker at that time.25 If this was the end of the story, it could be argued that this is a
relatively low cost for creating jobs. However, our econometric estimates indicate that only
a small portion of the subsidized jobs was actually created because of the incentives, which
substantially reduces the cost-eectiveness of the program. Depending on the actual estimate
of the employment impact, somewhere between 47% and 78% of the subsidized jobs under
Law 5084 would have been created without the program.26 As a result of these substantial
deadweight losses, costs per job-month range from 678YTL with our low estimate of jobs
created to 286YTL for the upper-end estimate. These subsidy amounts represent roughly
124% and 52%, respectively, of the average monthly cost of a minimum-wage worker. Using
the mid-range estimate of employment generation, the cost per job-month is 408YTL, about
74% of the total cost of employing a minimum-wage worker.27
Similarly, Table 14 provides the cost estimates for Law 5350. These cover the 8-month
period from May 2005 when the rst subsidies were paid under the new law to December
2005, the last month for which we have data. According to the SSK les, 368,551 job months
were subsidized under this law in the D 5350 provinces. The table shows our estimate of the
total cost of 92,970,931YTL. This means the cost per subsidized job-month was 252YTL,
which was about 42% of the total labor cost for a minimum wage worker during this period
(594YTL). Comparing this gure to that of cost per subsidized job under Law 5084 shows
that the level of subsidies was considerably larger under the rules of Law 5350. However,
once deadweight losses are taken into account, Law 5350 turns out to be more cost-eective.
Our empirical results suggest that, depending on the specication, between 23% and 44%
of the jobs subsidized under Law 5350 would have been created without the subsidy. These
25Since the potential size of the subsidies for all of the dierent components is signicantly higher than
that, it seems that a signicant proportion of subsidized employees worked less than a full month and/or
worked part-time.
26Our estimates are likely to overestimate the number of job-months created by the program as they assume
that all jobs created were subsidized from the rst month the program was in eect. Yet, as suggested by our
interrupted panel estimates, the eect of the subsidies may have picked up a few months after the beginning
of the program, which implies that the average duration of the subsidy for each worker is lower than the
length of the period in which the subsidy was in eect.
27This comparison is less meaningful if beneciary workers earned wages above the minimum. However,
the fact that average earnings declined as a result of the program and that the maximum subsidy is attained
for workers earning minimum wages suggest that most beneciaries earned wages around the minimum.
25deadweight losses, although by no means insignicant, are much lower than those estimated
for Law 5084. Accordingly, the costs per actual job created are much lower as well. We
calculate the cost per job-month created under low-end job creation estimate at 449YTL
and at 329YTL for our higher job estimate. These represent 76% and 55% of the total cost
of a minimum wage worker, respectively.
[Table 14 about here.]
The former calculations assume that the programs create new jobs. If it turns that the
programs increase registration rather than actual job creation, as suggested by the electricity
estimates, the benets of the program would be much lower. In this case, it would only entail
the expansion of basic health and pension coverage and perhaps higher wages for workers
who switch to formal jobs, if they were previously employed in less productive informal jobs.
Finally, it should be noted that the estimated costs of the program are only lower bounds of
real costs as they do not include the cost of possible substitution eects, the administrative
costs of implementing and supervising the programs, or the costs incurred by the government
to provide pension and health services to newly registered workers.
We draw two conclusions from this cost analysis. First, deadweight losses associated
with the program are important, but the design of the program clearly matters as it appears
that the eligibility thresholds signicantly reduced deadweight losses, by promoting higher
employment gains per workplace and, possibly, reducing the articial shift of workers to
newly created workplaces. Because deadweight losses were much smaller under Law 5350
than under Law 5084, the actual cost of jobs under the newer program was considerably less
even though the nancial outlay per subsidized worker was higher. Second, the possibility
that in developing countries marginal job subsidies do not increase total employment, but
rather, increase formalization, substantially alters the cost-benet analysis. There might be
alternative, more cost-eective, ways to extending basic pension and health services to a
larger pool of workers.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we examine the benets and costs of subsidizing the cost of low-income workers
in economically disadvantaged regions of Turkey. We take advantage of a series of consecutive
26programs, with widening regional coverage, to implement a pseudo-experimental approach.
This allows us to compare the evolution of employment, number of establishments, employ-
ment per rm, taxable earnings per worker, and consumption of electricity before and after
the dierent subsidies came into eect. Our results point to a substantial elasticity of em-
ployment to changes in labor costs. They also indicate that establishment creation is quite
responsive to changes in labor costs and labor taxes particularly when minimum wages or
other constraints may reduce pass through rates. All of these ndings suggest the impor-
tance of labor costs as a factor in determining employment creation both in the intensive
and the extensive margin.
Nonetheless, our results also suggest that implementing the subsidies can be a costly
way to increase employment. Under Law 5084, the subsidies likely ended up paying for
almost the full labor costs of the jobs created, rather than subsidizing employment at the
margin. The main issue was deadweight losses - i.e., that many subsidized jobs would have
been created anyway - which increased considerably the real cost of the program. This
is particularly a concern in Turkey given that the subsidies analyzed in this study were
implemented in a period in which economic growth was picking up after a crisis and rms
likely were prepared to hire new workers in any event. Law 5350 also had deadweight losses
but these were considerably smaller than those under the previous law. So, even though the
subsidies themselves were more generous, the program turned out to be more cost eective.
A nal, and key consideration is that although we were only able to undertake an im-
perfect test, our results suggest that subsidies increased formalization of existing rms and
jobs rather than creating new economic activity. This is a relevant distinction and deserves
close attention in future studies. If conrmed, it would alter the cost-benet calculations of
the program, as it would not imply new economic activity, but rather an extension in the
coverage of social security programs. This would support the hypothesis that in countries
with relatively weak enforcement institutions, high labor taxes on low-wage workers create
a strong incentive for informality both for rms and workers. From that point of view, ex-
empting (fully or partially) low-wage workers from income and social security taxes may be
an eective way to reduce informality and expand the coverage of basic health and old age
pension benets to the labor force. Such exemptions are not unlike those found in many
income tax systems in the world, where there is a certain minimum income that is exempted
and/or where tax rates are progressively set.
27A Description of Subsidy Coverage
Province No Province Name Law 4325 Law 5084 Law 5350
1 ADANA
2 ADIYAMAN X X X
3 AFYONKARAHISAR X X
4 AGRI X X X







12 BINGOL X X X





18 CANKIRI X X
19 CORUM X
20 DENIZLI
21 DIYARBAKIR X X X
22 EDIRNE
23 ELAZIG X
24 ERZINCAN X X
25 ERZURUM X X X
26 ESKISEHIR
27 GAZIANTEP
28 GIRESUN X X
28Province No Province Name Law 4325 Law 5084 Law 5350
29 GUMUSHANE X X X














44 MALATYA X X
45 MANISA
46 KAHRAMANMARAS X
47 MARDIN X X X
48 MUGLA
49 MUS X X X
50 NEVSEHIR X
51 NIGDE X




56 SIIRT X X X
57 SINOP X X
29Province No Province Name Law 4325 Law 5084 Law 5350
58 SIVAS X X
59 TEKIRDAG
60 TOKAT X X
61 TRABZON X
62 TUNCELI X X
63 SANLIURFA X X X
64 USAK X X
65 VAN X X X
66 YOZGAT X X X
67 ZONGULDAK
68 AKSARAY X X
69 BAYBURT X X X
70 KARAMAN X
71 KIRIKKALE
72 BATMAN X X X
73 SIRNAK X X X
74 BARTIN X X
75 ARDAHAN X X X




80 OSMANIYE X X
81 DUZCE X X
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37Table 2: Summary statistics of key variables (province-month as unit observation)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Employment 3555 65,831 216,343
Workplaces 3555 9,782 28,286
Taxable earnings (YTL) 3555 39,944,968 153,574,145
SSK subsidy provided under Law 5084 (YTL) 675 153,739 213,318
SSK subsidy provided under Law 5350 (YTL) 585 47,354 156,905
Energy subsidy (YTL) 700 185,594 358,826
Note: Summary statistics for employment, workplaces and taxable earnings are calculated for
the full sample (79 provinces during April 2002 to December 2005). SSK subsidy statistics are
calculated using the sample of provinces covered by the corresponding law for the period April 2002
to December 2005. Statistics for the energy subsidy are calculated using all subsidized provinces
for the period January 2004 to December 2005 when the data are available.
Table 3: Comparison of groups of provinces
Provinces
D 4325 D 5084 D 5350 D never
GDP per capita mean 941.14 1355.6 1798.38 2545.31
(USD 2001) sd 242.34 222.88 199.94 928.32
Electricity consumption mean 338,098.8 350,365 470,507.6 2,756,096
(MWH, 2002-2004) sd 337,426.7 201,610.2 406,888.3 3,809,520
Population per mean 53.18 76.4 63.85 176.88
km2 (2000) sd 31.25 67.68 52.19 333.52
Notes: Data on GDP per capita and electricity consumption are provided by the Turkish Statis-
tical Institute. Data on population density comes from the 2000 Census. D 4325 contains the
22 provinces that were subsidized under Law 4325; D 5084 includes the 15 provinces that were
subsidized under Law 5084 but not covered by Law 4325; D 5350 contains the 13 provinces that
were subsidized by Law 5350 but not covered by Law 5084. In that way, each group only includes
the eligible provinces added under each consecutive law. D never contains the provinces that were
not subsidized under any law.
38Table 4: Summary statistics for registered employment growth
Full Period Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
(April 2002- (April 2002- (January 2004- (May 2005
December 2005) December 2003) April 2005) December 2005)
All mean 0:013 0:008 0:016 0:020
provinces sd 0:088 0:101 0:085 0:046
D 5084 mean 0:013 0:004 0:020 0:023
provinces sd 0:042 0:045 0:043 0:029
D 5350 mean 0:013 0:012 0:010 0:026
provinces sd 0:124 0:173 0:060 0:052
D never mean 0:010 0:007 0:013 0:012
provinces sd 0:078 0:062 0:107 0:031
Alt 5084 mean 0:008 0:002 0:011 0:018
provinces sd 0:040 0:044 0:036 0:038
Alt 5350 mean 0:007 0:005 0:008 0:012
provinces sd 0:040 0:054 0:024 0:015
Table 5: Summary statistics for registered workplace growth
Full Period Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
(April 2002- (April 2002- (January 2004- (May 2005
December 2005) December 2003) April 2005) December 2005)
All mean 0:009 0:007 0:010 0:013
provinces sd 0:032 0:034 0:033 0:024
D 5084 mean 0:010 0:007 0:013 0:011
provinces sd 0:024 0:023 0:028 0:013
D 5350 mean 0:008 0:007 0:005 0:015
provinces sd 0:030 0:033 0:032 0:019
D never mean 0:007 0:006 0:007 0:011
provinces sd 0:018 0:018 0:019 0:012
Alt 5084 mean 0:008 0:006 0:006 0:013
provinces sd 0:023 0:022 0:027 0:013
Alt 5350 mean 0:007 0:006 0:006 0:012
provinces sd 0:019 0:018 0:022 0:011
39Table 6: Summary statistics for real wage growth
Full Period Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
(April 2002- (April 2002- (January 2004- (May 2005
December 2005) December 2003) April 2005) December 2005)
All mean 0:003 0:004 0:003 0:000
provinces sd 0:104 0:115 0:109 0:050
D 5084 mean 0:004 0:008 0:000  0:001
provinces sd 0:071 0:084 0:066 0:037
D 5350 mean 0:007 0:012 0:003  0:001
provinces sd 0:125 0:171 0:073 0:048
D never mean 0:005 0:006 0:006 0:001
provinces sd 0:108 0:090 0:146 0:041
Alt 5084 mean 0:004 0:006 0:002 0:000
provinces sd 0:070 0:072 0:077 0:046
Alt 5350 mean 0:004 0:008 0:003  0:001



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































43Table 10: Comparison of minimum wage to real average taxable earnings
Date D 5084 D 5350 D never Alt5084 Alt 5350 Minimum
provinces provinces provinces provinces provinces wage
April 2002-June 2002 324:26 308:80 442:53 378:68 418:05 222:00
July 2002-December 2002 357:89 326:88 461:04 404:44 416:97 250:88
January 2003-December 2003 440:56 427:64 558:90 483:24 496:88 306:00
January 2004-June 2004 565:37 551:96 694:48 616:49 629:44 423:00
July 2004-December 2004 506:01 499:11 663:55 572:19 589:59 444:15
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Table 12: Consumption of electricity in treated and control provinces
Dependent
Dependent Variable: Variable:
Log(total electricity) Growth of
Electricity
1. period 1. date 1. date 1. date
dummies dummies dummies dummies
2. group 2. province 2. province 2. province
dummies dummies specic trend dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D 4325  D post  0:077  0:077 0:033 0:043
(0:037) (0:045) (0:099) (0:081)
D 5084  D post  0:056  0:056 0:007 0:008
(0:027) (0:033) (0:053) (0:050)
D 5350  D post  0:031  0:031  0:019  0:024
(0:025) (0:031) (0:065) (0:060)
D post 0:141 0:174 0:000 0:000







Observations 237 237 237 158
Adjusted R-squared 0:516 0:995 0:997  0:048
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
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